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9.  The Components and Boundaries of Mechanisms 
Marie I. Kaiser 
 
Most new mechanists agree that mechanisms are made of two kinds of components (see 
Chapter 1). The first kind of components are material objects that are variously called entities 
(Machamer, Darden and Craver (MDC) 2000), parts (Glennan 1996, 2002) or component 
parts (Bechtel 2006, 2008). Examples include neurotransmitters, muscle fibers and genes. The 
second kind of components are variously called activities (MDC 2000), interactions (Glennan 
1996, 2002) or operations (Bechtel 2006, 2008). They are what entities do and what produces 
change (MDC 2000). Examples include binding, contracting and being transcribed. I will use 
the term ‘component’ to refer to these two kinds of things that make up or compose 
mechanisms.1 
Since the origin of the new mechanical philosophy metaphysical questions about the 
components of mechanisms (hereinafter ‘mechanistic components’) figure prominently in the 
debate (e.g., Tabery 2004, Psillos 2004, Machamer 2004, Bogen 2008, Torres 2009, Illari and 
Williamson 2013). MDC (2000) provoked this dispute by defending a dualistic ontology of 
mechanistic components, according to which mechanisms are made up components belonging 
to two distinct ontological categories: entities (having certain properties) and activities. MDC 
contrast their dualism with Glennan’s (1996, 2002) allegedly monistic view that mechanisms 
consist of entities (having certain properties) and of interactions, which are nothing but 
occasions on which a property change of one entity brings about a change in properties of 
another entity.  
The dispute between dualists and monists involves two sets of metaphysical questions: 
first, how can the two kinds of mechanistic components be further characterized? What are 
their major features and what distinguishes them from each other? How are entities/parts and 
activities/interactions/operations related to more well-known ontological categories, such as 
material objects, properties, processes, events, and dispositions? I address these questions in 
Section 9.1. Second, what is the relation between the two kinds of mechanistic components? 
Is one more fundamental than the other? Can activities, for instance, be reduced to entities and 
their properties? In what sense are the two kinds of mechanistic components mutually 
dependent? I examine these questions in Section 9.2. 
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The second part of this chapter (Sections 9.3 and 9.4) is concerned with the 
individuation of the components of mechanisms and with the boundaries of mechanisms. 
Mechanisms are always mechanisms for specific phenomena or behaviors (Glennan 1996, 
2002). Accordingly, the components of a mechanism are individuated with respect to the 
phenomenon the mechanism is responsible for (see Chapters 1 and 8): Only those 
entities/parts and activities/interactions/operations that are relevant to the phenomenon count 
as components of the mechanism. This raises the question of how to spell out the conditions 
of relevance. What makes entities/parts and activities/interactions/operations relevant to a 
specific phenomenon? How do we draw the boundary between what belongs to a mechanism 
and what does not? In Section 9.3, I present different criteria for individuating the 
components of mechanisms – natural boundaries, robustness/stability, strength of interactions, 
mutual manipulability, and INUS conditions – and I discuss their merits and limitations.  
The claim that the individuation of a mechanism (by individuating all of its 
components) depends on the characterization of the respective phenomenon invites the 
question of how real the boundaries of mechanisms are. Mechanistic antirealists, as I call 
them, argue that mechanisms do not exist as well-delineated entities in nature because it is the 
scientist who imposes boundaries on certain sets of components while pursuing specific 
explanatory interests and adopting specific perspectives (Bechtel 2015; see also Wimsatt 
1972, 2007). In Section 9.4, I examine whether such an antirealistic move is inevitable and 
which arguments can offered to defend the realistic view that mechanisms exist in nature and 
have real boundaries and a determined set of components. 
 
9.1 The Ontological Nature of Mechanistic Components 
The goal of this section is to provide a general characterization of the two kinds of 
components that make up mechanisms. I will refer to mechanistic components as entities and 
as activities because entity-activity terminology has prevailed in the debate (even Glennan 
forthcoming speaks about activities now) and because there are good reasons for this 
terminological choice: First, the term ‘entity’ is more suitable than the term ‘part’ because, as 
I argue somewhere else (Kaiser forthcoming), being a component of a biological mechanism 
is not the same as being a biological part of a biological object in general. The components of 
a mechanism are individuated with respect to a single behavior, whereas the parts of 
biological objects are individuated with respect to all of their characteristic behaviors. 
Moreover, natural boundaries are crucial to the individuation of biological parts but they do 
not constrain the individuation of mechanistic components in the same way (more on this in 
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Section 9.3). Second, we can drop Bechtel’s (2006, 2008) term ‘operation’ because he does 
not tie any metaphysical claim to this term. Third, against the term ‘entity’ one might object 
that it is commonly used as a placeholder term for any ontological category (including 
activities) and that we should be more precise and speak about material objects instead 
(Kaiser and Krickel 2016). But in the context of this handbook it is advisable to stick to the 
term ‘entity’ in this specific usage because it is an established term in the debate. Fourth, I 
prefer the term ‘activity’ over the term ‘interaction’ because interactions can plausibly be seen 
as special kinds of activities. Fifth, against the concept of an activity one might object that it is 
too restrictive and should be replaced by the broader metaphysical concept of an occurrence 
(which includes processes, events, and states; Kaiser and Krickel 2016). For the present 
purposes, however, I stick to the familiar concept of an activity while critically discussing 
what activities are. 
 
I begin here by considering what entities are (as components of mechanisms). The mechanism 
for muscle contraction is composed of entities such as actin filaments (i.e., strands of actin 
molecules), calcium ions, and sarcoplasmic reticula (i.e., cell organelles involved in the 
storage and release of calcium ions). What the new mechanists refer to as ‘entities’ are 
concrete material objects that are located in space and time. Typically, entities are spatially 
extended, have certain shapes and sizes, and often are surrounded by characteristic spatial 
boundaries, such as the membrane comprising the sarcoplasmic reticulum. Entities exist in 
time and are wholly present at different time points. Contrary to activities, entities are not, 
themselves, temporally extended in the sense of having temporal parts.2 A calcium ion in my 
muscle fiber now is wholly present; it does not consist of the calcium ion now, the calcium 
ion two days ago, the calcium ion in one minute, etc. Entities can engage in processes, events, 
or activities which are temporally extended (e.g., diffusing through a channel). But the 
calcium ion as such is not temporally extended. In metaphysical terms, entities are 
continuants not occurrents, as activities are (Kaiser and Krickel 2016).  
Entities are bearers of properties, including dispositional properties (or “causal 
powers”; Glennan forthcoming). Properties allow entities to engage in specific activities 
(MDC 2000, 3; Craver and Darden 2013, 16). For example, a sarcoplasmic reticulum is 
surrounded by a membrane that contains different kinds of ion channels and ATP-driven 
calcium pumps. These properties enable the sarcoplasmic reticulum to engage in the activity 
of releasing calcium ions.  
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Psillos (2004, 312) draws our attention to the fact that entities can exist without 
actually engaging in activities (e.g., if entities do not manifest their dispositions). I agree that 
entities, in general, can exist without engaging in any activities. But the important point is that 
entities can only be components of mechanisms if they engage in activities. Without doing 
something an entity cannot be relevant to the phenomenon the mechanism is responsible for. 
All conditions of relevance require something to occur, something to be active (see Section 
9.3). Hence, component entities are necessarily involved in activities, that is, they are 
“working entities” (Darden 2008, 961; Craver and Darden 2013, 18). But we need to be 
cautious at this point. Entities that are components of mechanisms need not be active at all 
times. For the working of some mechanisms it is important that entities engage in activities 
only at certain times, not at others. For example, the sarcoplasmic reticulum releases calcium 
ions when an action potential arrives, not during later stages of the mechanism for muscle 
contraction. To conclude, an entity can be a component of a mechanism only if it is involved 
in an activity at least once while the mechanism proceeds from its beginning to its end. 
Component entities, however, can be involved in activities in different ways. They can 
have an active role and initiate or maintain the activity (i.e., be “actors”; Glennan 
forthcoming), such as the ATP molecule that binds to the calcium pump. On the other hand I 
think entities can also be passively involved in an activity and allow for or undergo the 
activity, such as the calcium pump to which the ATP molecule binds. This difference has not 
been recognized in the debate so far. Furthermore, there can be activities in which two or 
more entities with an active role are involved, such as the sliding of actin and myosin 
filaments past each other. According to the strict reading of the word, such cases would be 
examples of interactions. In the debate, however, the term ‘interaction’ is used in a wider 
sense as referring to any activity in which more than one entity is involved – let it be 
passively or actively (e.g., Tabery 2004, Glennan forthcoming). 
Finally, it has been argued that, as components of mechanisms, entities must be “stable 
clusters of properties” (Craver 2007a, 131) and must “have a kind of robustness and reality 
apart from their place within that mechanism” (Glennan 1996, 53). For example, ATPases 
(i.e., transmembrane proteins that transport ions to produce ATP) can be found in a variety of 
different mechanisms in different organisms and they retain their properties also if studied in 
isolation, that is, if studied in different contexts than in situ (Kaiser 2015, 221-235). Even 
though stability and robustness may not succeed as criteria for identifying the components of 
mechanisms (see Section 9.3) they might still be important features that many component 
entities share.  
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Main Features of Entities 
(1) Entities are material objects (i.e., continuants). 
(2) Entities are bearers of properties, which allow them to engage in specific 
activities. 
(3) As components of mechanisms, entities necessarily engage in activities (at 
least once during the mechanism). 
(4) Entities can be actively or passively involved in activities. 
(5) Entities are relatively stable and robust. 
 
I move now to considering what activities are (as components of mechanisms). These are the 
second kind of components that make up the mechanism for muscle contraction: activities 
such as sliding, releasing, and binding. “Activities are the things that the entities do” 
(Craver/Darden 2013: 16). As such, activities are necessarily temporally extended and possess 
characteristic durations, rates, and phases. For example, the binding of ATP to the calcium 
pump starts with the collision of the ATP molecule with a certain region of the pump, then 
certain chemical bonds are formed. Because activities do not only exist in time – as entities do 
as well – but are also extended in time and have temporal parts (i.e., stages), they belong to 
the metaphysical category of occurrents, which encompasses processes, events, and states 
(Kaiser and Krickel 2016). 
Activities are thought to be “active rather than passive” and to be the “happenings” 
(Machamer 2004: 29) in a mechanism. It is this active nature of activities that seems to make 
them indispensable if one wants to account for the alleged activeness of mechanisms (MDC 
2000: 5), and it is their active nature that is said to distinguish activities from, for instance, 
property instantiations or property changes (Glennan forthcoming rejects this; more on this in 
Section 9.2). As I show elsewhere, it follows from the active nature of activities and from 
their ontological status as occurrents that activities must be actualized or manifest rather than 
merely potential or dispositional (Kaiser and Krickel 2016). Only manifestations of 
dispositions can be components of mechanisms; unmanifested dispositions cannot. It is the 
release of calcium ions that is a component of the mechanism for muscle contraction, not the 
unmanifested disposition of the sarcoplasmic reticulum to release calcium ions if a 
depolarization occurs.  
 Dualists claim that activities account not only for the active nature of mechanisms but 
also for their productivity (MDC 2000; Tabery 2004; Bogen 2008; Darden 2008). In their 
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view, the order of activities in a mechanism exhibits a “productive continuity” (MDC 2000: 
3): one activity productively causes the next, which ensures that a mechanism runs in its 
typical way from beginning to end (see Chapter 10). For example, the release of calcium ions 
into the cytosol causes the binding of calcium ions to troponin molecules, which causes the 
tropomyosin complex to move off the actin binding site, which causes the myosin head to 
bind to the actin filament, and so on. Hence, activities are characterized as the “producers of 
change” (MDC 2000: 3) and as the “causal components in mechanisms” (Craver 2007a: 5).3 
 Another central feature of activities is that they require entities that engage in them. 
As MDC put it, “there are no activities…that are not activities of entities” (2000: 5). Any 
activity requires at least one entity that engages in it. I think we can add to this that for each 
activity there must be at least one entity that is actively involved in it. That is, activities seem 
to require actors. For example, a gene can be passively engaged in the activity being 
transcribed but there must be another entity that is actively involved in the same activity, such 
as the DNA polymerase. 
Different types of activities involve different numbers of entities. In other words, 
activities have “unrestricted arity” (Illari and Williamson 2013: 72; my emphasis). Binary 
activities, such as the binding of ATP to the calcium pump or the sliding of actin and myosin 
filaments past each other, are widespread and also activities that involve many entities, such 
transcription or osmosis, are common in the living world. In my view, there are also clear 
examples of activities that involve only one entity (so called unary activities or “un-interactive 
activities” Torres 2009: 243), such as the changing of the spatial conformation of a protein, 
the breaking of a chemical bond, and the closing of a stoma cell in a plant leaf. Other authors, 
however, question the existence of un-interactive activities (Tabery 2004; Fagan 2012). They 
claim that for an activity to be productive it must involve not less than two entities and thus be 
an interaction (or a “jointly acting complex”; Fagan 2012: 464). Tabery (2004) argues that 
seemingly un-interactive activities, such as shifting conformation of a protein, still involve 
interactions on a lower level. This argument is not convincing because the claim was that 
there is no other entity (besides the protein) involved in the conformation shift. This is 
compatible with there being interactions among the parts of the protein. Furthermore, Fagan 
(2012) fails to provide an argument for why all component entities must form complexes that 
jointly act. I conclude that there are cases of unary activities and that interactions thus 
constitute a mere subset of the set of all activities. 
One might want to add the sixth feature that activities do not only produce changes 
(i.e., act as causes) but also, themselves, involve changes in the properties of the engaged 
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entities (i.e., are processes). An example that supports this claim is the release of calcium ions 
from the sarcoplasmic reticulum into the cytosol. This activity involves several changes, such 
as the calcium ions changing their location and the sarcoplasmic reticulum changing its 
concentration of stored calcium ions. Despite its initial plausibility, I think we should reject 
the claim that activities must involve changes because it overlooks the variety of mechanistic 
components. For the working of some mechanisms, it is crucial that certain properties are not 
changed but maintained (i.e., continuously instantiated) during a certain time span. For 
instance, it is essential for the mechanism of the action potential that some ion-channels 
remain open for a certain period of time. Moreover, the mechanism of natural selection seems 
to consist also of “passive properties” (Skipper and Millstein 2005: 341), such as being 
camouflaged or being present (see Chapter 23). Examples like these show that not all 
component activities involve changes, which is why this feature is not listed below.4 
 
Main Features of Activities 
(1) Activities are temporally extended (i.e., occurrents). 
(2) Activities are actualized (rather than merely potential). 
(3) Activities produce change (i.e., are types of causes). 
(4) Activities require at least one actively involved entity. 
(5) Activities have unrestricted arity (i.e., involve one to many entities). 
 
9.2 The Relation between Mechanistic Components 
This section examines the relation between entities and activities as components of 
mechanisms. Is the relation one of reduction? Can entities, for instance, be said to be more 
fundamental than activities? Or are both kinds of components ontologically on a par, for 
instance, because they are mutually dependent? These questions trace back to the already 
introduced dispute between dualists (MDC 2000, Machamer 2004) and monists (Glennan 
1996, 2002) that has been prominent in the new mechanical philosophy. In this section, I first 
clarify in what respects dualists and monists have different views about the relation between 
mechanistic components. Then I critically discuss the arguments that have been provided in 
favor of dualism. 
 
To begin with clarifying the dualism versus monism debate, MDC argue that “[m]echanisms 
are composed of both entities (with their properties) and activities” (2000: 3). I call the claim 
that mechanisms consist of components of two kinds Duality thesis. This is a quite weak 
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thesis because monists can accept it as well. Glennan argues that mechanisms are “complex 
systems” that consist of “parts” (1996: 52; 2002: 344) having relatively stable properties and 
interacting with each other in certain ways. Hence, even though Glennan (1996, 2002) denies 
that mechanisms are composed of entities and of activities, he also recognizes a second kind 
of components, namely interactions. In his recent work, Glennan (forthcoming) agrees with 
even MDC’s version of the Duality thesis because he refers to the components of mechanisms 
as entities (or parts) and activities and characterizes interactions as a special, important class 
of activities. 
Contrary to dualists, however, monists reject the Irreducibility thesis. This is the claim 
that the two kinds of mechanistic components belong to two distinct ontological kinds in the 
sense that one cannot be reduced to the other. Glennan characterizes an interaction between 
parts as an “occasion on which a change in a property of one part brings about a change in a 
property of another part” (2002: 344). In other words, Glennan (1996, 2002) assumes that 
interactions are reducible to the properties of entities and rejects the Irreducibility thesis. He is 
thus only committed to the existence of entities (i.e., material objects) and their properties, 
including dispositional properties. By contrast, MDC (2000) postulate the existence of 
activities on top of the usual commitments to entities and properties. Because of this 
additional ontological category MDC’s approach is referred to as dualistic and contrasted with 
Glennan’s monistic account.5 
Dualism is characterized by two further assumptions. The first is the Interdependency 
thesis which says that entities and activities necessarily exist together and determine each 
other. MDC state that “no activities without entities, and entities do not do anything without 
activities” (2000: 8). This is why the new mechanists use terms such as “acting entities” 
(Craver 2007a: 189) or “working entities” (Darden 2008: 961). The Interdependency thesis 
does not reinforce the dualistic character of MDC’s approach – one might even argue that it 
runs contrary to it – but it is central to their approach. Second, MDC (2000) defend what I call 
the Parity thesis. It is the claim that there is no priority of, for instance, entities over activities 
and that entities and activities are ontologically on a par (Illari and Williamson 2013: 70).6 
Strictly speaking, the Parity thesis is no independent thesis because it follows from the 
dualists’ assumptions of irreducibility and interdependency. 
In sum, MDC’s (2000) dualism can be distinguished from Glennan’s (1996, 2002) 
monism by the following three claims: 
 
 
 
9 
Core Theses of Dualism 
(1) Irreducibility thesis: Entities and activities belong to two distinct 
ontological kinds because activities cannot be reduced to the properties of 
entities. 
(2) Interdependency thesis: In mechanisms, entities and activities necessarily 
exist together and determine each other.  
(3) Parity thesis: Entities and activities are ontologically on a par. 
 
In his recent work, Glennan (forthcoming) seems to have partly converged to MDC’s 
(2000) dualistic position. He speaks of entities (or parts) and activities as the components of 
mechanisms and he agrees with MDC in that there cannot be activities without entities, nor 
entities without activities (which is the Interdependency thesis). Moreover, Glennan rejects 
the reproach that his account is guilty of an entity-bias. That is, he seems to want to accept the 
Parity thesis. This is, however, the point at which the remaining difference between MDC 
(2000) and Glennan (forthcoming) becomes apparent. Glennan rejects the label of dualism 
and the claim that entities and activities are two distinct ontological categories because he 
thinks that the ontological distinctness of entities and activities is incompatible with the 
interdependency of entities and activities. In other words, he sees an incompatibility between 
the Irreducibility thesis (in particular, the distinctness claim it contains) and the 
Interdependency thesis. On my view, this casts into doubt Glennan’s approval of the Parity 
thesis because if entities and activities are not ontologically distinct and activities can be 
reduced to property changes of entities, it seems highly questionable that entities and 
activities are ontologically on a par. To conclude, Glennan (forthcoming) has converged to 
dualism by accepting the existence of activities and the Interdependency thesis but he still 
rejects the distinctness claim that the Irreducibility thesis contains and thus fails to 
convincingly defend the Parity thesis. 
 
Having examined the nature of the disagreement, I will now go on to explore challenges to 
dualism. Even though entity-activity talk dominates the debate, dualism and the ontological 
category of activities are still disputed (e.g., Woodward 2002, Psillos 2004, Machamer 2004, 
Tabery 2004, Bogen 2008, Torres 2009, Illari and Williamson 2013, Glennan forthcoming). 
In this section, I introduce and critically discuss five major arguments that have been offered 
in defense of dualism. 
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The new mechanists agree with other philosophers that philosophy of science should 
pay close attention to actual scientific practice. They accept “descriptive adequacy” (MDC 
2000: 8; Kaiser 2015: 9) as an important criterion of adequacy not only for epistemic but also 
for metaphysical claims (Kaiser and Krickel 2016). Dualists make use of this criterion and 
argue that only dualism is descriptively adequate because it accounts for the fact that 
scientists describe mechanisms in terms of entities and activities (i.e., by using nouns, such as 
‘enzyme’ and ‘repressor’, and verbs, such as ‘inhibits’) and because successful scientific 
practice is a practice of studying and manipulating activities (Illari and Williamson 2013: 73-
5; see also Craver 2007a, 144-52). This might be convincing but it should be noted that the 
claim that activities play an important role in scientific practice does not represent a brute fact 
about science. It is already a philosophical interpretation or critical reconstruction of specific 
parts of scientific practice which can be contested (Kaiser 2015: Chapter 2). In my view, a 
monist might have equally good reasons for viewing scientific practice as a practice of 
studying objects, their properties and how these properties change through time. Descriptive 
adequacy can thus also be used as an argument against dualism. 
 A second argument stresses the “epistemic adequacy” (MDC 2000: 21) of dualism. 
Dualists argue that thinking about mechanisms in terms of entities and activities renders 
scientific phenomena intelligible because entity-activity language corresponds best to how we 
naturally describe the world (Machamer 2004: 31; Illari and Williamson 2013: 79). For 
example, we say that a neurotransmitter binds to a receptor (activity talk), not that a 
neurotransmitter changes from being unbound to being bound to a receptor (property talk), 
nor that a neurotransmitter manifests its bonding capacity (disposition talk). Even if this claim 
raises questions about the naturalness of descriptions and even if it may have exceptions I 
share the intuition that activity talk is more comprehensible than property or disposition talk 
and I agree that activity talk corresponds well to how scientists describe and explain 
phenomena. When compared to an entity-disposition ontology, dualism is claimed to be 
epistemically more adequate because we can observe a disposition of an entity only through 
the disposition being manifested, that is, through the entity acting (MDC 2000: 4; Machamer 
2004: 30; Illari and Williamson 2013: 78). This is true but proponents of an entity-disposition 
ontology can accept the conceptual dependency of dispositions on their manifestations 
without being committed to the existence of activities in particular. In general, one might 
object that all of these arguments refer to mere epistemic points that have no metaphysical 
relevance (Psillos 2004: 313). But I agree with the dualists that metaphysicians of science 
should pay attention to the epistemic practices in the sciences. 
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 MDC also appeal to common metaphysical intuitions to support dualism. They claim 
that dualism is advantageous because it captures “healthy philosophical intuitions underlying 
both substantivalist and process ontologies” (2000: 4). The ontological category of entities 
accounts for the fact that activities or processes are not free-floating but that there is always 
an entity involved in an activity or process. The ontological category of activities, in turn, 
accounts for the fact that mechanisms are dynamic and “do things” (MDC 2000, 5) and thus 
cannot consist of entities having certain properties only (recall Section 9.1; Kaiser and Krickel 
2016). Dualism is able to account for these motivating intuitions because it conceives of 
entities and activities as ontologically distinct and on a par. The problem with this argument is 
that it remains unclear to which kind of intuitions the dualists refer. The argument would be 
plausible if they referred to a sort of pre-theoretical intuitions that metaphysical theories must 
account for (even then there might be disagreement about which intuitions are legitimate). 
However, MDC speak about philosophical intuitions and seem to have something more 
theoretical and more metaphysically laden in mind. 
 Another argument in favor of dualism is that only activities sufficiently explain the 
activeness and the productivity of mechanisms (MDC 2000, Tabery 2004, Bogen 2008). Only 
activities specify how in a mechanism one property change brings about another property 
change (i.e., how one entity interacts with another). In Tabery’s words, the ‘bringing about’ in 
Glennan’s interactions are “black boxes” (2004: 10) that can only be rendered intelligible by 
activities. For instance, the activity releasing is said to specify how the change of the 
sarcoplasmic reticulum’s ion channel from closed to open brings about the shift in the 
location of some calcium ions. Dualists claim that if you reject the Irreducibility thesis and 
argue that activities are nothing but property changes you will overlook the active and 
productive nature of mechanisms. This concern seems to be confirmed, for example, by 
Glennan’s thesis that “mechanisms are things (or objects)” (2002: 345), such as watches or 
cells. As I argue somewhere else, from a dualistic perspective, it becomes clear that bare 
objects that are neither active nor productive (i.e., that do not involve any occurrent), such as 
a stopped watch, cannot be mechanisms (Kaiser and Krickel 2016). But the argument that 
only dualism accounts for the productive nature of mechanisms encounters also serious 
problems. First, dualists fail to provide a clear and metaphysically satisfying analysis of what 
productivity is (e.g., Woodward 2002; Psillos 2004). Second, the “black box problem” seems 
to be not a problem for monists but rather “is one for scientists to solve in the laboratory” 
(Torres 2009: 239) because scientists are the ones to discover how, exactly, one particular 
property change brings about another.  
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 A final argument in favor of dualism pertains to parsimony. Illari and Williamson state 
that an entity-activity ontology is more parsimonious than an entity-disposition ontology 
(2013: 79-81). At first sight, this claim might be surprising because dualism accepts the 
existence of activities on top of the usual ontological commitments and thus entails a rather 
unparsimonious move. However, Illari and Williamson do not compare dualism with monism, 
but rather an entity-activity ontology with an entity-disposition ontology. They argue that, due 
to the restricted arity of dispositions (they attach to only one entity), an entity-disposition 
ontology results in a proliferation of indefinitely many dispositions, which is why an entity-
activity ontology is more parsimonious. This argument raises the question which kind of 
parsimony is most important. On which level of graininess should we evaluate parsimony? If 
the goal of metaphysics is to reveal the fundamental structure of reality I doubt that it is worse 
to have fewer general ontological categories (entity, property) and more numerous ontological 
sub-categories (different entities, many different properties). 
 
9.3 Individuating Mechanistic Components  
The new mechanists agree that mechanisms consist of all and only those components that are 
relevant to the specific phenomenon that the mechanism is responsible for. The term 
“responsible for” (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005: 422; Illari and Williamson 2012: 123) can 
be specified in two ways: etiological mechanisms cause their phenomena, whereas 
constitutive mechanisms constitute their phenomena (Kaiser and Krickel 2016). Figure 1 
illustrates the triangular relationship between mechanistic components, a mechanism, and a 
phenomenon. 
 
Fig. 1: Relationships between components, mechanisms, and phenomena 
 
Figure 1 raises the question, for instance, how we should spell out the relevance 
relation between components and phenomena. This question has an epistemic and a 
metaphysical side. Epistemically, we are asking for a criterion of explanatory relevance: What 
are the explanatorily relevant factors that must be represented in a mechanistic explanation of 
components 
phenomenon 
mechanism 
relevant to responsible for      (constitutes/causes) 
make up 
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a given phenomenon? How do we distinguish adequate mechanistic explanations from mere 
descriptions?7 Metaphysically, the question of relevance is a question about where the 
boundary of a particular mechanism runs: Which entities and activities belong to the 
mechanism for a specific phenomenon? Which criteria tell apart genuine components of a 
mechanism from mere pieces, correlates, redundant parts, or background conditions? 
The two types of mechanisms allow us to distinguish two kinds of relevance relations. 
The components of etiological mechanisms are causally relevant to their phenomena, whereas 
the components of constitutive mechanisms are said to be constitutively relevant to their 
phenomena. Since the notion of causal relevance has been subject to extensive philosophical 
discussion the new mechanists focus on the notion of “constitutive relevance” (Craver 2007a: 
139-60; 2007b; see Chapter 14).8 I conclude this section by reviewing different possible 
criteria for individuating the components of constitutive mechanisms. 
 
One might first suggest identifying the boundaries of mechanisms with what I call “natural 
boundaries” (Kaiser 2015: 176) of biological objects (e.g., Darden seems to suggest this; 
2008: 960). Paradigmatic examples of natural boundaries are the cell membrane, the 
exoskeleton of insects, the skin, the blood-brain barrier, and the chain of mountains that 
borders a particular ecosystem. I agree that the existence of natural boundaries is essential to 
the working of many mechanisms. For example, the mechanism for muscle contraction 
requires that the muscle fiber is surrounded by a membrane that functions as a selective 
barrier and receives extracellular signals. In most cases, however, these natural boundaries 
will not be the boundaries of the mechanism but of the corresponding biological object (e.g., 
of the muscle fiber).  
According to my account, the boundary of a mechanism differs in two respects from 
the boundary of the corresponding object (what Craver refers to as ‘S’ in his characterization 
of the phenomenon ‘S’s ψ-ing’; Kaiser and Krickel 2016). First, mechanisms frequently 
transgress natural boundaries (Craver 2007b: 9). For instance, the mechanism for muscle 
contraction is composed also of entities, such as neurotransmitters, that are located outside the 
membrane of the muscle fiber. Also the gecko adhesion mechanism includes entities that 
belong to the gecko’s environment (Kaplan 2012: 552). Hence, natural boundaries seem to be 
crucial to identifying the parts of biological objects in general (e.g., muscle fibers or geckos; 
Kaiser forthcoming) but not to individuating the components of mechanisms (e.g., the 
mechanism for muscle contraction or the gecko adhesion mechanism).  
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Second, biological objects, such as cells or geckos “do many things at once” (Glennan 
1996: 52) and all of these characteristic behaviors are relevant to individuating the parts of the 
biological object (Kaiser forthcoming). By contrast, mechanisms are responsible only for a 
single phenomenon (e.g., muscle contraction or gecko adhesion) and mechanistic components 
must be relevant to this phenomenon only. Hence, a mechanism typically includes many 
fewer entities than are parts of the corresponding system. To conclude, natural boundaries fail 
to provide us with adequate criteria for demarcating mechanisms because the condition of 
being located inside a natural boundary is neither necessary nor sufficient for an entity to be a 
component of a mechanism. 
 
A second idea for how to identify the boundaries of mechanisms is using strength of 
interactions. The idea that the intensity of interactions determines part-whole relations can be 
traced back to Simon (1962). This claim is based on the observation that, at least in “nearly 
decomposable” (1962: 474) systems, interactions among the parts of an object are generally 
stronger and more frequent than the interactions between an object’s parts and its 
environment. For example, the forces holding together a molecule are much weaker than 
those holding together atoms within the molecule. Other authors have picked up Simon’s idea 
and applied it to the boundaries of mechanisms (e.g., Haugeland 1998; Wimsatt 1974, 2007).  
This account, however, faces various problems. In general, it is quite difficult to assess 
and compare the strength of interactions. We seem to need to specify a threshold that will 
depend on pragmatic considerations of researchers. In addition, the strengths-of-interaction-
criterion seems unable to exclude background conditions and sterile effects as components of 
mechanisms (Craver 2007a: 143f). Finally, when looking at actual biological practice we 
recognize that the strength of interactions may play a crucial role in individuating biological 
objects such as populations or ecosystems (e.g., Hunemann 2014; Kaiser forthcoming) but not 
in individuating the components of biological mechanisms. 
 
As a third possibility, we might turn to an account of constitutive relevance. Craver (2007a: 
139-60; 2007b) has offered the most elaborated and widely discussed account of constitutive 
relevance. He identifies two conditions under which an acting entity (X’s φ-ing) is 
constitutively relevant to a phenomenon (S’s ψ-ing) and thus is a component of the 
mechanism for this phenomenon: the parthood condition and the mutual manipulability 
condition.  
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The parthood condition requires that “X is a part of S” (Craver 2007a, 153) or that X is 
“contained within S” (Craver and Tabery 2015). Hence, Craver seems to identify parthood 
with spatial inclusion. According to my view, the assumption that any component entity X 
must be spatially included in the corresponding object or system S encounters two major 
objections. First, it overlooks that temporal relations between component activities and the 
phenomenon of interest are important as well (Kaiser and Krickel 2016). Second, it conflicts 
with the fact that many mechanisms transgress natural boundaries (a fact that Craver, himself, 
recognizes; 2007a, 141) and include also entities and activities that are spatially located 
outside the corresponding object or system S (recall the discussion of natural boundaries in 
this section).  
The second condition of Craver’s account of constitutive relevance relies on 
Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation (2003) and requires mechanistic components 
and phenomena to be mutually manipulable. This means that there must be an ideal 
intervention on the putative component X’s φ-ing that changes the phenomenon S’s ψ-ing and 
there must be an ideal intervention on S’s ψ-ing that changes X’s φ-ing. This part of Craver’s 
account of constitutive relevance has recently attracted much philosophical attention (e.g., 
Harbecke 2010; Couch 2011; Leuridan 2012; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2016; Harinen 
forthcoming). It has been objected that Craver’s account is merely epistemic and does not 
provide a satisfactory metaphysical analysis of what constitutive relevance or constitution 
really is (Harbecke 2010, Couch 2011). It seems to me that this criticism is too premature. 
Even though Craver’s analysis of the explanatory and investigative practices of neuroscience 
(2007) is not intended to be a metaphysical analysis it can easily be used to draw 
metaphysical conclusions about the relation of constitution (Kaiser and Krickel 2016). 
Another criticism is that Craver’s notion of constitutive relevance turns out to be a subtype of 
causal relevance and thus requires rethinking either Woodward’s notion of an ideal 
intervention or the mutual manipulability account altogether (Leuridan 2012; Baumgartner 
and Gebharter 2016; Harinen forthcoming; see also Woodward 2014). 
 
Finally, I will consider what are known as ‘INUS conditions’. Regularity theories of 
constitution (Harbecke 2010; Couch 2011) develop criteria for individuating mechanistic 
components by making use of Mackie’s idea of a cause being an INUS condition (i.e., an 
Insufficient but Non-redundant part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition for the effect; 
Mackie 1965). The general idea is that a component is an insufficient but necessary part of an 
unnecessary but sufficient mechanism for a phenomenon. This idea nicely captures the fact 
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that a single component is insufficient for a phenomenon. A component must always be a 
non-redundant member of a “team” (Gillett 2013: 311) of components, which, together, are 
sufficient for the phenomenon. The criterion also accounts for the possibility that different 
particular mechanisms might be sufficient for a certain type of phenomenon.  
It is problematic that regularity theories of constitution either require mechanistic 
phenomena to be capacities, which is an inadequate view of what constitutive mechanistic 
phenomena are (Kaiser and Krickel 2016), or they conceive of constitution as a relation 
between types only, which presupposes a realism about biological kinds that is heavily 
contested. Moreover, the claim that a mechanistic component must be a necessary member of 
a team of components raises the well-known problem of how to exclude mere correlates from 
being components (see also Craver and Tabery 2015). 
 
9.4 Are Boundaries of Mechanisms Real? 
A scientific realist might begin with the intuition that mechanisms exist out there in nature 
independently of the scientists discovering and representing these mechanisms. Where one 
mechanism ends and another starts seems to be an objective feature of reality, which depends 
neither on our ability to individuate mechanistic components nor on our having an account of 
constitutive relevance. Mechanisms seem to be real things with real boundaries.  
Although many mechanists share these realist intuitions, a realist interpretation of the 
boundaries of mechanisms encounters serious challenges. A commonly held assumption is 
that how one identifies the components of mechanisms depends upon the phenomenon one 
seeks to understand (recall Section 9.3). Characterizing the phenomenon differently will yield 
different sets of relevant components and thus result in drawing the boundary of a mechanism 
differently. Since the choice of the phenomenon is relative to scientists’ explanatory interests 
some authors have argued that the identification and decomposition of mechanisms is an 
inherently “perspectival” matter (Darden 2008: 960; see also Kauffman 1971; Wimsatt 1972, 
2007). From here it seems to be only a small step to the antirealistic claim that mechanisms do 
not exist as well-delineated things in the world but that scientists impose boundaries on 
mechanisms relative to their explanatory purposes (Bechtel 2015). The aim of this section is 
to discuss whether such an antirealistic move is inevitable and which arguments a realist 
might invoke to defend the independent existence of boundaries of mechanisms. 
 Let us begin with the claim that characterizing a phenomenon guides and constrains 
the individuation of the components of a mechanism. According to the new mechanists, 
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characterizing the phenomenon confines the space of possible mechanisms in so far as it uses 
the language of a given field and implicitly calls up a set of explanatory concepts and a “store 
of accepted entities, activities, and organizational structures that people in the field are 
licensed to use” (Craver and Darden 2013: 67). The relation between mechanisms and 
phenomena is thought to be reciprocal: not only does the nature of the phenomenon constrain 
what is to be included in the mechanism, findings about the mechanism can also force one to 
“reconstitute the phenomenon” (Bechtel and Richardson 2010: 173).  
But does this imply that the boundaries of mechanisms are not real in the sense of 
being no objective feature of reality? I think it does not. A realist can agree that for different 
token phenomena there exist different token mechanisms with different boundaries and that 
the choice of scientists of which phenomena to study may change over time and is dependent 
on pragmatic factors such as the scientist’s perspective and explanatory interests. A realist 
would, however, emphasize that as soon as the phenomenon of interest is sufficiently 
specified and fixed the boundaries of the mechanism for this phenomenon are fixed, too, and 
do not depend on pragmatic factors. This way a realist can agree that the choice of the 
phenomenon is relative to the scientist’s interests and perspective while holding on to the idea 
that for each token phenomenon there exists a token mechanism out there in the world that 
has a well-delineated, real boundary. Such a realistic position is taken up, for instance, by 
Glennan (forthcoming), and it seems to be the position that Craver is also committed to (not 
least because of his ontic conception of explanation; 2014). 
 Other authors reject the realistic assumption that boundaries of mechanisms exist in 
nature independently of the fact that scientists take specific perspectives and pursue certain 
explanatory goals when decomposing mechanisms. Wimsatt, for instance, argues that in the 
case of “interactionally complex” systems, different “theoretical perspectives” give rise to 
different non-isomorphic decompositions of a system into parts with “non-coincident 
boundaries” (Wimsatt 1974: 69-71). This sounds quite antirealistic, as if Wimsatt claimed that 
parts and boundaries would exist only relative to theoretical perspectives. But at other places 
in his work, Wimsatt explicitly defends realism – though he is keen to add that his realism is a 
realism for a “messy world” and is “piecemeal and usually satisfied with a local rather than a 
global order” (2007: 5f.; see also 1974: 672).  
We can find antirealism about the boundaries of mechanisms more explicitly in the 
recent work by Bechtel. He draws on research in Neurobiology to show that “mechanisms as 
bounded entities don’t exist” (2015: 84). Marom’s (2010) argument that the time-course of 
many phenomena in the life sciences is scale-free, in Bechtel’s view, does not challenge the 
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mechanistic account. It merely shows that the common view of mechanisms as temporally 
and spatially well-delineated entities is literally false – even though it is an idealization that 
facilitates developing scientific explanations. Bechtel argues that it is “the scientists who 
impose boundaries around entities and activities in nature and impose a time scale on which 
their functioning is characterized” (2015: 85). A realist may object that if boundaries of 
mechanisms do not exist in the actual world, mechanisms do not exist either, because it is 
indeterminate which entities and activities belong to which mechanism. Bechtel’s antirealism 
seems to result in the implausible view that the world consists of loose entities and activities 
only. Alternatively, Bechtel’s antirealism can be read as turning the mechanistic account into 
a purely epistemic account that has been detached from almost all ontological commitments. 
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